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ceive that the American statute purports to declare that the enforcement of a
foreign limitation of liability would be offensive to our notions of justice, while
at the same time enacting a limitation of liability substantially like those of
foreign countries. If, on the other hand, the distinction is made between the
substantive limit of liability and the steps whereby this limit may be obtained
by a shipowner, the applicable policy arguments relevant to the conflict of laws
all are in favor of the restricted scope of the statute. If these policy arguments
and the correct conflict-of-laws theory were followed, the American courts would
apply the monetary limit of the American statute only when referred to that
statute by choice-of-law rules. But as matters now stand, insofar as The Titanic
limits the applicability of foreign limitation of liability statutes, it operates as
a last remnant of the idea that each nation should mete out the law of nations
as it interprets that law. This notion has long been repudiated and has been
superseded by the conflict of laws, a legal technique based upon a more realistic
appraisal of world conditions.' 6
LEGAL STATUS OF INFANT EN VENTRE SA MtRE
Traditionally the question of whether an infant can sue for injuries sustained
while en ventre sa m~rer through the negligence of others has been answered in
the negative.2 The principal reasons given for denying recovery have been:3
" A recent article in the Columbia Law Review agrees that The Titanic should be reexamined. Knauth, Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law, 49 Col. L.
Rev. 1 (1949). Concerning the Black Diamond case, the author notes that three different suits
are being brought against the owners. The British shipowners are suing in England, the cargo
owners are suing in the United States, and a wreck removal suit will be brought in Belgium.
He points out that if the United States and Great Britain both declare the limitation of
liability to be a matter of procedure, "the parties plaintiff, by artfully dividing their lawsuits
between these very three States (each of which has a statute limiting a shipowner's liability)
will actually circumvent the common policy declared by all three States, and may succeed
in recovering judgments aggregating over $2,ooo,ooo-or seven times the Belgian limitation
statute figure-and will presumably collect on those judgments." In Mr. Knauth's opinion
The Titanic will contribute to this result, although, "[tihe Court's ruling on the limitation
point has always been a matter of some doubt, and it may now be re-examined in the Merganser-Norwalk Victory litigation [the Black Diamond case]."
I The term "en ventre sa more" refers to a child still within the mother's womb.
2 Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Stemmer v. Kline, 128
N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942); Ryan v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, t8 N.J. Misc.
429, 14 A. 2d 52 (194o); Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d 28 (194o); Smith v.
Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. ioo, ig N.E. 2d 446 (1939); Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274
N.W. 710 (1937); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944
(z935); Stanford v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 65i, io8 So. 566 (1926); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light
Co., z64 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (iSi6); Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights Ry. Co., r54App. Div.
667, z39 N.Y. Supp. 367 (igi3); Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co. of Ireland, 28 L. R. Fr. 69
(i891). Contra: Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939) (on the basis of a California statute); Montreal Tramways
v. Leveflle, 119331 4 Dom. L.R. 337; Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App., 1923)
(published in 1949). See also notes 12 and 13, infra.
3See Judge Pound's opinion in Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220. 133 N.E. 567 (192I), in
which he lists as reasons for denying recovery: i) lack of authority, 2) practical inconvenience
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(E) that the unborn child has no separate existence apart from its mother, and
thus there is no individual to whom the tortfeasor owes a legal duty;4 (2) that
there is a lack of precedent for permitting the infant to recover; s and that it is
too difficult to prove that the injuries sustained by the unborn child were the
result of the defendant's negligence.6 These reasons have been examined by
textbook authors and other writers7 and rightly rejected by most of them. They
have argued that since the interests of an infant en ventre sa m~rehave been protected in criminal and property law," there is no reason why these interests
should not be protected under tort law. Lack of precedent and difficulties of
proof of physical injury, particularly in view of the great advances medical
science has made in recent years,9 should never be the grounds for denying relief.
Although the writers have been almost unanimous in rejecting the traditional rationale for denying the unborn child's claim, they have, nevertheless, accepted the distinction made in some of the cases 0 between injury to a viable
child and injury to a nonviable child."x It is said that recovery would be per-

and possible injustice, 3) no separate entity apart from the mother and, therefore, no duty
of care, and 4) no person or human being in esse at the time of the accident.
4 This was judge Holmes's rationale in the leading case of Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, r38 Mass. 14 (x884) and this reasoning was followed in most of the succeeding cases
denying recovery. See also Prosser on Torts 188 (r941);
MImLnV. ,-UCKlartlt,

299 [.

tU.i1pp.

100,

19

52

Am. Jur. 440 (1944).

N.r.-. 2 t 440 V 9391.

6Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,

124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 9 44 (i935).
on Torts 188 (194); Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of
Torts, io Calif. L. Rev. 461, 463 (1922); Frey, Injuries to Infants en Ventre sa Mare, 12 St.
Louis L. Rev. 85 (1927); Straub, Right of Action for Pre-natal Injuries, 33 Law Notes 205
(x930); 35 Ill. Bar J. 266 (i947); 20 So. Calif. L. Rev. 231 (1947); 26 Neb. L. Rev. 431 (1947);
15 U. of Kan. City L. Rev. 66 (1947); 32 Corn. L. Q. 6og (i947).
s The authorities on this point are voluminous. The following from a note in 44 Yale L. J.
1468, 1469 (I935) summarizes the state of the law quite well: "It is not true, however, that for
all purposes a child en ventre sa mareis non-existent, either physically or legally. Thus in the law
of property he is in esse-for all purposes which are to his benefit. He may take by descent or
under a will or marriage settlement, have a guardian appointed, be made an executor, and,
through his guardian, may secure an injunction to stay waste. The criminal law also regards
him as a separate entity. Thus it has been held that when a child born alive dies as a result of
prenatal injuries inflicted by an unlawful beating of the mother, the wrongdoer is guilty of
murder."

7 Prosser

9 See Maloy, Legal Anatomy and Surgery 669-87 (1930); Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence
§§ 860-975 (193I).
10 This distinction, which is also of significance in the abortion cases in criminal law, was
suggested by Holmes in the Dietrich case and followed in almost all of the subsequent cases
dealing with prenatal injuries. In Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272,
159 N.W. 916 (i916), the court denied recovery only because the rights of a nonviable child
were involved. Both Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (946) and Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.
2d 352 (1923) which permitted recovery explicitly limited the holding to recovery for injury
to a viable child.
IxA viable child is one that is capable of living outside its mother's womb and depends on
its mother for sustenance only. The term is used here as describing a stage of foetal develop-
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mitted only in the former situation, because the nonviable child is not an entity capable of suffering injury. Two recent cases, one in Minnesota-2 and the
other in Ohiox3 permitted recovery on the basis of this distinction. In the former
case, a viable child died prior to birth as result of the doctor's negligence in
treating its mother, while in the latter the infant plaintiff was injured when its
mother fell from the steps of a bus operated by the defendant's servants in a
negligent manner.
This "viable and nonviable" distinction has been defended on the ground
that it reduces speculation as to whether the defendant's negligence was the
cause of the injury, and thus helps to surmount the difficult problem of proof.'4
But if the reasons given above for investing the unborn child with a legal personality are valid, this distinction is unsound, for it should make no difference
at what stage of embryonic development the foetus is when injured.
There is an interesting aspect of these "en ventre sa mere" cases which neither the writers nor the cases have considered. Assuming that the personality
and proof difficulties barring the unborn child's recovery are discounted as unsound, can the infant, consistent with modern theories of tort liability for negligence, recover? Although it is obvious why the courts which did not recognize
the infant as a legal entity did not address themselves to this problem, it is not
so obvious why the few courts which did permit the infant to recover ignored
this question. Perhaps these courts felt that the result of such an inquiry would
be self-evident, for, as the infant en ventre sa mre is in a sense part of the
mother, proof of negligence toward the latter would be proof that there was
negligence toward the former. But if the infant is to be recognized as a separate
legal entity, its cause of action should be determined solely on its own merits.
Present tort law in the United States has, to a great extent, rejected the policy
of imposing unlimited liability.5 Liability for negligence is discussed in such
limiting terms as duty, foreseeability, or proximate cause, which cut down the
responsibility of a negligent defendant to the point where his legal liability is
commensurate with his wrong. Judge Cardozo, in Palsgrafv. The Long Island
R. Co.,6 discussed some of the principles limiting liability in negligence cases.! 7
ment. It should be noted, however, that medical science regards the child as in being from the
moment of its conception. See note 9 supra.
12 Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (Minn., 1949) (personal representative of infant
permitted to maintain action under a wrongful death statute).
13 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E. 2d 334 (Ohio, x949).
X4See 15 U. of Kan. City L. Rev. 66 (1947).
is See Holmes, The Common Law io5 (1881).
16 248 N.Y. 339, 62 N.E. 99 (1928).
17 This opinion has been the object of much discussion, and various interpretations of Cardozo's opinion have been offered. See Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence, A Retreat
from Rationalization, 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 36 (r938); Prosser on Torts, 184 (i941); Seavey,
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 381 (2939); Green, Judge and
Jury 244 (1930).
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Negligence, he said, is a term of relationship. The defendant, to be negligent,
must be negligent with respect to a particular person, and the hazard which his
negligence has set up must foreseeably be capable of causing an injury to that
individual. 8 "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed,
and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension."19
If, then, negligence is a matter of relation which must be founded upon the
foreseeability of the hazard causing harm to the person injured, can the infant
plaintiff in the prenatal injury cases recover? The result may depend on whether
the tortfeasor is, or should be, aware of the existence of the unborn child.20
Where, as in the medical malpractice cases, the infant's presence is or should
be known, it is foreseeable that the negligence of the tortfeasor may cause injury, and the infant should certainly be permitted to recover. 2'
A more difficult problem arises in the automobile or train accident situation
where the defendant is unaware of the existence of the infant en ventre sa m~re,
and where to hold him liable for the injuries suffered by the unborn child may be
imposing upon him too great a financial responsibility. In a much discussed
Wisconsin case,2 the court refused to hold the defendant liable for the death of
a mother who suffered a miscarriage on seeing her son run down by the defendant. The imposition of such a duty on the tortfeasor, the court believed, would
be imposing liability wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent
party. This reasoning is applicable here. If it is assumed that there will always
be a certain proportion of women pregnant then the defendant can reasonably
be expected to contemplate the possibility that his negligence may result in injury to an infant en ventre sa mre, and he should be held liable. But if such an
assumption is not made, then, by holding the defendant liable, an unreasonable
burden would be placed upon a negligent tortfeasor, for the risk here is one that
is not reasonably to be perceived.
The same difference in result might ensue if these cases are determined on
the basis of a "proximate cause" rationale. The particular result will depend on
what theory of liability the term "proximate cause" represents. If, in accord
with what is widely held to be the English view,23 a defendant is held liable for
2

IsThe cases dealing with liability for negligent use of words seem to lend support to this
theory. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (x931); Courteen Seed
Co. v. Hong Kong &Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N.Y. 337, ,57 N.E. 272 (1927); Jaillet v.
Cashman, 235 N.Y. 5ii, i39 N.E. 714 (1923); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E.
275 (1922).

Palsgraf v. The Long Island Ry. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
See Boggs's dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (igoo).
21In Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946), the infant plaintiff was injured through
the malpractice of the surgeon in removing it from its mother's womb. The court held that the
plaintiff's complaint stated a good cause of action.
22Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
19

20

'3 Smith v. London & South Western Ry. Co., L.R. 6 C.P. 14 (1870); In re Polemis, [1921]
3 K.B. 56o; Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K.B. 141. Here the court permitted the plaintiff to
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all the consequences that can be traced to his negligence whether the hazard
thereby set up is foreseeable or not, the defendant, in these prenatal injury cases,
should be held responsible. If, however, a court feels that a defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury only if the hazard to the plaintiff can be foreseen,'4 then the tortfeasor may or may not be held liable depending on whether the hazard set up was foreseeable.
The treatment of the responsibility of the defendant to the infant as an ordinary question of liability for negligence gives rise to another problem: The
infant plaintiff may be met with the defense that the contributory negligence
of the mother should be imputed to it and thus bar its recovery. Some of the
older cases did recognize the defense of imputed contributory negligence where
an extremely young child, negligently allowed by its parents or guardians to become exposed to danger, was injured by a negligent defendant. 25 These decisions
were based on the argument that the custodian was the infant's agent for its
care and thus, with respect to third persons, the neglect of the agent was the
neglect of the infant. The later cases repudiated this reasoning26 and permitted
the child to recover on the ground that the guardian or parent was not the agent
of the infant, but of the law. There was, therefore, no relationship on which to
base the imputation of negligence. 27 The result in these latter cases seems to be

the preferable one. Ordinarily, the plaintiff who has been contributorily negligent is prevented from recovering not because of any solicitude for the tortfeasor, but rather because of a policy of the law against permitting a party to
profit by his own lack of prudence and care.28 However, this reason does not
recover on facts almost identical with those in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 6o3,

258 N.W.

497 (1935).

24 Proximate cause can also be used to describe the proposition that even if the defendant
was negligent in some respects and even if the negligence was in fact causally contributive to
the harm complained of, the court will nevertheless direct a verdict for the defendant if, in its
opinion, the eventuality complained of was not a foreseeable incident of the defendant's negligence: Wood v. Pa. Ry. Co., 177 Pa. 3o6, 35 Atl. 699 (x896); Hoag v. Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Ry. Co., 85 Pa. 293 (1877); Ryan v. N.Y. Central Ry. Co., 35 N.Y. 2io (i866).

"The leading case for this view is Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. (N.Y.) 615 (1839).
26 Warren v. Manchester St. Ry., 7o N.H. 352,47 At. 735

(9oo);

Newman v. Phillipsburg

Horse Car Ry. Co., 5 2N.J.L. 446 (I8go); Bellefontaine &Indiana Ry. Co. v. Snyder, i8 Ohio
St. 399 (1868). These cases set the pattern for all the modern cases on this point.
'7 Underlying the cases permitting the child to recover in spite of the negligence of its parent
or guardian is the view that the relationship required for the imputation of negligence is such
that the child plaintiff, if he were being sued as a defendant for the negligence of the parent,
would be held vicariously liable. Since it is manifest that the child cannot be so held, these
cages have said that it would not be logical to impute the guardian's negligence. But, it has
been maintained by Gregory in his articles on Imputed Contributory Negligence in 2 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 173 (1935) and 41 Yale L.J. 831 (1932), that this requirement is unsound because
the reason behind the imposition of vicarious liability-that of providing a financially responsible defendant for an injured party to sue-is not the reason for the imputation of negligence.
2 In Bellefontaine &Indiana Ry. Co. v. Snyder, I8 Ohio St. 399, 409 (I868) the court listed
as the reasons for barring a contributorily negligent plaintiff's claim: (i) the mutuality of
wrong involved would entitle each party alike, where both are injured, to an action against the
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apply when the rights of an infant injured while en ventre sa m~re are under
consideration, for the child has been guilty of no wrong or omission. Otherwise
a great injustice might be done if financial protection were to be denied to a
youngster who may have suffered a permanent injury.

CONSIDERATION OF PUNISHMENT BY JURIES
It is frequently stated that juries in criminal cases are to determine the question of guilt or innocence from the evidence alone and that a consideration of
the severity of the penalty to be imposed should not influence their verdict.'
Observance of this rule is essential to the preservation of the doctrine of "reasonable doubt,"'2 since the slightest consideration of a light sentence or of a
quick parole may exert just the degree of influence necessary to persuade the
doubtful juror to agree to a verdict of guilty.3 Moreover, since juries are not to
be judges of the law,4 they should not be given the opportunity to decide that
other, (2) it is unfair to allow a party to recover for his own wrong, and (3) it is a policy of
the law to make the personal interests of the parties dependent upon their own prudence and
care.
I People v. Sherman, 264 App. Div. 274, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 171 (1942); People v. Warner, 289
Mich. 5x6, 286 N.W. 81i (1939); State v. Doucet, 77 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (1933); State v. Lunsford, 163 Wash. 199, 300 Pac. 529 (1931); State v. Bell, 2o6 Iowa 816, 221 N.W. 521 (X928);
People v. Santini, 221 App. Div. 139, 222 N.Y. Supp. 683 (1927); Liska v. State, ix5 Ohio St.
283, 152 N.E. 667 (1926); State v. Kernan, 154 Iowa 672, 135 N.W. 362 (1912); State v.
Satcher, 124 La. ioi5, 5o So. 835 (i909); State v. Gill, 14 S.C. 410 (i88o).
2 A well known definition of the term "reasonable doubt" is that expressed by Chief Justice
Shaw in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 320 (1850). It is "that state of the
case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds
of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.... The evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a
reasonable and moral certainty---a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and
satisfies the reason and judgment. ..."
It is stated in Wigmore, however, that this degree of certainty is an "elusive and undefinable state of mind." He suggested that all efforts toward definition be abandoned and that
juries be left to apply "reasonable doubt" as words of common usage. 9 Wigmore, Evidence

§ 2497 (3d ed. i94o).
3 "[Considering that a very slight circumstance may affect the verdict, the danger from
putting before the jury anything that may improperly influence their deliberations becomes
more apparent." Miller v. United States, 37 App. D.C. 138, x44 (1911). If the jury receives
the impression that the penalty may not be serious, such impression will be almost certain
to affect the verdict in doubtful cases.
4 A. L. I. Code of Crim. Proc. § 323 (1931); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § ixx8, at 606 n. 57,
58 (I94o). To an extent the right tobring in a general verdict gives to a jury the power to
determine the law as well as the facts by acquitting a defendant in opposition to the court's
instructions on the law. If this power is improperly exercised, the error is not remediable, since
a defendant may not be tried twice for the same crime. It is usually stated that a jury has the
power to disregard the law as explained by the court, but not the moral right to do so. Commonwealth v. Castellana, 277 Pa. I17, 121 Ati. 5o (1923); Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va.
o)
466, ioS.E. 745 (i89
;i6 CJ.Criminal Law § 2273, at 922 n. 2 (i918).In some jurisdictions,
however, it has been held that it is legally permissible for a jury to disregard a court's instructions on the law, and that the judge may give an instruction to this effect. Hengstler v. State,

